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5. There are a number of elementary acts that are not integrated with other reaction systems and remain relatively independent acts throughout the life of the organism. They may respond to stimuli independently of other organized reactions which concern the organism as a whole. Such acts belong in the categories of reflexes, such as knee-jerk, winking, sneezing, yawning, etc.

By way of conclusion, we may state that such a theory we have so far advanced is not an altogether new one. The importance of the spontaneous and random activities of the young organism has been duly emphasized by Professor Watson.²⁴ But we can not agree with him that, besides the activities of this sort, there is another group of innate reactions or instincts. In fact, the results of his investigation on the behavior of the new-born babe do not indicate any appearance of specific instincts, except a vast number of random movements. Having failed in discovering specific instincts in the young babe, he is forced to accept the theory of temporal order of appearance of instincts which has not any scientific proof and has been rejected altogether in this paper. Further, he has done violence to his own definition of instinct when he accepts many of the conventionally listed instincts. For, as we have seen, the responses of these instincts involve a great deal of variability and it is very hard to find in them any definite inherited neural patterns which is his essential conception of instinct. We are, therefore, obliged to repudiate all his theories of instinct. For we have found that the random or unorganized acts in the young babe are sufficient to account for all complex and organized forms of behavior in adults, and that it is not only superfluous but harmful to our genuine understanding of human behavior to assume the existence of any specific instinct.

Note. This article was placed in the hand of the Editor in February, 1921. After several months an article, entitled "The Misuse of Instinct in Social Sciences," by L. L. Bernard, appeared in the March number of *Psychological Review* (1921). While my position regarding instinct is different from that of Bernard there is some relation between these two articles. I wish to call attention to the fact that my article was accepted by the Editor before I had access to Bernard's article.

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CLASSICISM AS AN EVANGEL

"THE knowledge of what is possible is the beginning of happiness." This sentence when reflected upon will start in different minds trains of thought resulting in contrary conclusions:

²⁴ See *Behavior*, Chaps. 4 and 6, and *Psychology*, Chaps. 7 and 8.

opposed to one another alike in their ideas of happiness and of knowledge.

To some the saying will convey an intimation that things "as they are" are things with possibilities; that the world as it is at this present point of time is not a closed world but a world with unrevealed possibilities; that what is eulogistically called "the order of the world" is still forming. Hard upon the heels of this surmise, there will follow a leap to the thought that happiness, our happiness, is to be found in living in the realm of these possibilities, in endeavoring to discover them and to employ the fixed and stable elements in things as they now are as means for the realization of possibilities. In some way, vague or defined, there will be an identification of happiness with aspiration, with endeavor, with energy spent in embodying possibilities in the actual, thereby transforming the actual. This attitude fixes the place of knowledge in the good. Insight into actuality and its possibilities contributes to happiness because it is an integral part of the process of transformation, a part which is more than a means because it is such an indispensable means.

Other persons will associate the meaning of the sentence with *our* possibilities rather than with the possibilities of things. The lesson of the sentence is then one of limitation, of check upon aspiration and desire. The source of unhappiness is romantic aspiration to escape the bounds which are set by things as they are; the beginning of happiness is to acknowledge the inevitable, to identify our thought and choice with the fixed order of the universe. Renunciation of the extravagant in will and fancy, adoption of the order of things as the order of life: there lies the key to a happiness which is rational, mature, sane. This view also has its implication for the office and place of knowledge. To overpass the limits of the actual is impossible; to strive to do so is the petulance, the untamed folly, of childishness. In renouncing this impossible good, we attain to the good of insight. The reward of understanding things as they are gives the joy of the only mastery within the power of man; we attain peace through the calming of troubled aspirations for the unreal and impossible and become sharers in the delights of visions of eternal and untroubled truth. 'To know is man's highest good. In terms of the history of thought, with the Spinozistic conformity of desire and will to the eternal order comes the Aristotelian divine bliss of the life of theory.

To one whose instincts and habits spontaneously lead to a conception of possibilities on the basis of possibilities of things, this latter interpretation seems rooted in the subjective, or, to speak

frankly, in the egoistic. It indicates a subconscious determining concern with one's self. It is a reversed romanticism. Romanticism avowedly begins with the life of emotion and desire set over against the structure and system of the world. Out of the material of fancy and desire it builds another world which it asserts is the truly real world because it is the ideal world. One who becomes aware of the insolent egotism, the unbridled immaturity of such an attitude, and who contemplates the havoc which has been wrought by neglect of the conditions of life and action, naturally turns to contemplation of the order of the world. This order fixes the limits of legitimate imagination and will; its contemplation secures attainment of insight in a sure and elevated happiness.

Such an one becomes, in short, a classicist. Measure, order, proportion, limit, is the nature of the world, and reason is the voluntary perception and intelligent adoption of measure as the rule of life. Instinct, fancy, aspiring desire, is the great enemy. But unconscious antique classicism was a spontaneous response to the conditions of life in days when things seemed to have no possibilities except such as were realized in the cycle of nature without the participation of human choice and effort. It was rooted in a view of finite, finished possibilities of the world. It did not spring from any consideration of our possibilities. It was innocent of the thought of the claims, limited or unlimited, of the self. To recover such classicism by beginning with the thought of the possibilities of desire and choice, with the thought, disguised, of the ego is impossible. The attempt violates the principle of regard for conditions, for structure, which is the essence of classicism. For it ignores the conditions under which the classic spirit was a spontaneous response to nature itself. For this reason, I have called modern class-conscious classicism a reversed romanticism. It is evangelical, not spontaneous, for it is preoccupied with salvation. The fact that its conception of salvation is reasonable while that of romanticism is fantastic does not alter the preoccupation. It only changes the spirit of ancient art into a gospel of the estheticism of secluded knowledge.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct. G. STANLEY HALL. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1920. Pp. ix + 378.

The substance of this book was given in weekly lectures in Clark